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ABSTRACT: Using time-series techniques and panels data, the paper analyses for 
the EU countries in the period 1970-2009 the existence and shape of the “BARS 
curve” (Barro, Armey, Rahn, and Scully), connecting the size of Government (meas-
ured by the share of public expenditure on GDP) to the rate of economic growth. Indi-
vidual countries research has been conducted for 12 countries for whom enough time se-
ries were available, while panel analysis has been performed both for EU-27 and for 
subgroups, distinguished by their different socio-economic and monetary structures, and 
per capita GDP. BARS curves were generally found, and the shares of actual public 
expenditures generally exceed substantially those related to the maximization of GDP 
growth. However, great differences do emerge. For the 12 countries examined by time-
series techniques, the difference between the actual level and the peak of the BARS 
curve ranges from 5.7 points for Germany and 18.1 points for Belgium. Panel data 
analysis for EU-27 shows a peak of the BARS curve at 37%, while the actual level 
is about 47%. While, panel data disaggregation shows a similar situation for the 
Western Continental Countries, with a smaller gap for Anglo-Saxon countries. For 
low per capita GDP countries the peak is higher than for the mature economies. So, 
further research may prove useful to show light on the disparities emerging in the em-
pirical analysis of individual countries and of the panel sub-groups. However, the pre-
sent research provides enough evidence that high GDP countries of EU have overcome 
the level of government size compatible with GDP growth rate maximization. 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction; 2. Optimal size of Government and “BARS curve” 
in literature; 3. Econometric methodology and the data; 4. The estimates; 5. Conclud-
ing remarks and policy implications. 
KEYWORDS: Government size; economic growth; BARS curve; public expendi-
ture; EU-27. 
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1. – Introduction 
Growth theory has a central role in modern macroeconomics. However for 
a long time studies on growth haven been based on SOLOW’s (1956) neo-
classical approach, which focuses on the importance of two factors related 
to long-term growth, i.e. exogenous technological changes and convergence 
of per capita income. If one assumes that all the determinants of growth are 
exogenous, it is clear how economic policies are not susceptible of influenc-
ing the growth process – unless temporarily during the transitional phase of 
an economy towards its stationary state. As a consequence, the role of Gov-
ernment in the growth process in this approach has been neglected. 
The models on growth developed by ROMER (1986), LUCAS (1988), 
BARRO (1989; 1990) and REBELO (1991) devise a new (endogenous) theory 
of growth, with a role of Government in the growth process. Indeed ac-
cording to this new approach, both the growth rates in the transitional 
phase and those associated to the stationary condition are endogenous, thus 
implying that the growth rates of long-term economic activities are endoge-
nous. And in the endogenous approach to growth the positive and negative 
influence of Government on the growth process, cannot be overlooked. 
These factors as BROS, DE GROOT, and NIJKAMP (1999) showed, are both 
direct and indirect. In this perspective long-term growth rates can differ 
among the various countries, and the convergence of per capita incomes is 
not necessary. Thus, for instance, DAR and AMIRKHALKHALI (2002) 
pointed out how the three main instruments of budget policy (taxation, 
public expenditure and overall balance) can influence the long-term growth 
process through the efficient use of resources, factorial accumulation rate 
and dynamics of technological process. 
Obviously Governments, at the various level, provide both intermedi-
ate public goods that can be considered as factors of production and as 
factors for the private consumption, and goods for final consumption 
or/and redistribution purposes. While public expenditure, in a general 
meaning, is necessary to have a functioning market economy and to pro-
mote GDP growth, its expansion cannot necessarily be consistent with the 
maximization of the long-term rate of GDP growth. Indeed, if size of the 
Government grows then free market economy goes down. An equilibrium 
among them has to be found. This does not mean that this equilibrium 
should be that where the GDP growth rate is maximized. An high growth 
with an unbalanced society may not be consistent with the welfare maxi-
mization in any of the various meaning of this complex concept. Never-
theless to know whether there is a point beyond which the increase size of 
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the public expenditure as it exists, and financed in given countries reduces 
the growth rate is extremely important. It helps in choosing among the 
different objectives of the public policy and in looking to the possibility of 
reconciling them, as far as possible, by improving the quality of the public 
sector and that of the growth process. A recent approach to the effects of 
Government size on economic growth is centred on the “BARS curve”, 
which relates the rate of economic activity to public expenditure, considered 
as a peculiar proxy of Government size (ARMEY (1995); RAHN and FOX 
(1996); CHAO and GRUBEL (1998); VEDDER and GALLAWAY (1998); 
TANZI and SCHUKNECHT (1998a; 1998b; 2007); SCULLY (1998; 2000; 
2002; 2004); PEVCIN (2003; 2004; 2008)). As stated in OSBAND and RI-
JCKEGHEN (2000), a low value of public deficit/GDP ratio and public ex-
penditure/GDP ratio are two key-factors (“fundamentals”) to prevent a 
financial crisis, as well as to guarantee a safety environment for net capital 
inflows. Moreover, some recent studies tend to shed light on themes very 
close to the BARS curve, such as the relationship between budget deficit 
and GDP growth (ALESINA and ARDAGNA (2009)), or the effects of public 
debt on economic activity (REINHART and ROGOFF (2010)). While, FEDELI 
and FORTE (2010) show that high public debt/GDP ratio in the long run 
causes high unemployment rates. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 provides a survey of 
economic literature on this issue. Section 3 presents an overview of the ap-
plied empirical methodology and a brief discussion of the data used. Section 
4 discusses the empirical results, either for time-series analysis or panel-data 
models. Section 5 contains our concluding remarks and policy implications. 
 
2. – The Optimal Size of Government and the “BARS curve” in litera-
ture 
The concept of “optimal size of Government” was formulated by ARMEY 
(1995), who proposed in 1979 the homonymous curve. Similar to the 
“LAFFER curve”1 – representing the relationship between tax flows and the 
average tax rate through an “upside-down U”-shaped graph – the “ARMEY 
curve” shows instead the relationship between public expenditure (defined 
as a share of the domestic product) and the variation of the general welfare 
                                                 
1 See: LAFFER A.B., SEYMOUR J.P., The Economics of the Tax Revolt: A Reader, 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1979. 
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of the country à la PIGOU (defined as the growth rate of aggregate produc-
tion), showing the same “upside-down U” shape. The idea beneath AR-
MEY’s work is that very low levels of public expenditure would not allow the 
State to guarantee the respect of contracts and the protection of property 
rights, and thus a positive growth rate. On the other hand, very high rates of 
public expenditure would not entice citizens to invest and produce, as fiscal 
pressure would be huge, and in this case, too, growth would suffer. More-
over, given that by nature the productivity of public enterprises grows less 
compared to the market one, the higher the public share of resources, the 
more probable the decrease of total productivity. As a consequence, higher 
expenditures together with low levels of public intervention in the economy 
give a strong impulse to economic activity; while fiscal expansions, linked 
with high levels of expenditure, trigger a slowdown of the economic activ-
ity, taking the place of a more efficient alternative use of the same resources 
on behalf of the private sector. Thus, there is an optimal level in the rela-
tionship between public expenditure and GDP so to maximize the aggre-
gate income growth. In particular, according to CHAO and GRUBEL (1998), 
this level appears to be lower than the one maximizing fiscal revenue (or the 
point of maximum revenue in the “LAFFER curve”). In their opinion, some 
expenditure budgets would generate discouraging effects, reducing the risk 
components in the various agents’ economic life, and changing the eco-
nomical behaviour of the individuals, thus reducing the effective labour 
supply and free enterprise. A reduction of the economic growth rate would 
result. 
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Figure 1 – BARS curve. 
 
Source: GWARTNEY, LAWSON, and HOLCOMBE (1998). 
 
In the field of endogenous growth models, BARRO (1989; 1990) pointed 
out that a raise in taxation reduces the growth rate through triggering dis-
couraging effects. At the same time, however, the increase in public expen-
diture causes the rise of marginal productivity of capital, – and thus – it has 
a positive effect on growth. The second measure prevails when the dimen-
sions of the public sector are smaller, while the first one when the public 
sector is very wide. Thus, the effect of Government expenditure on eco-
nomic growth is non-monotonic. In this way the “BARRO Rule” is formu-
lated, and according to it public services are provided at an optimal level 
when their marginal product is unitary. Graphically, then, the relation be-
tween the growth rate of economy and the variation rate of public expendi-
ture follows an upside-down U-shaped curve. 
Analyzing the relation among tax rates, public revenue and economic 
growth in 103 countries, SCULLY (1994; 1998; 2000; 2002; 2003) found out 
that economic growth rates are maximized when public expenditure is ap-
proximately equal to the fifth part of the aggregate income, as excessive in-
creases in the expenditure have a substantially depressive effect on eco-
nomic growth. 
RAHN and FOX (1996) carried out an empirical analysis reaffirming the 
existence of an optimal size of Government, graphically represented 
through an upside-down U-shaped curve. These first studies on the topic 
suggested to some scholars to name such curve differently, i.e. BARS (due 
Optimal Size of Government and Economic Growth in EU-27 
FORTE – MAGAZZINO 
 
- 6 - 
 
to BARRO, ARMEY, RAHN, and SCULLY contributions). 
VEDDER and GALLAWAY (1998) moved from the recognition that in the 
history of mankind there has never been any society who experienced wide-
spread wealth without providing a public apparatus: otherwise, economic 
activity and welfare would be penalized by complete anarchy. For this rea-
son, the first functions bestowed to the state entity – guaranteeing order 
and the rule of law, and defending the property right –, in line with classical 
economic thought, have a strong impact on economic development. The 
presence of the State thus becomes a necessary but insufficient condition 
for prosperity. On the other side, collectivistic societies with planned econ-
omy failed because of the centralization and monopolization of the alloca-
tion of resources and decisions in the economic field. As a result, the ex-
pansion of the public sphere beyond a certain limit is subjected to the “law 
of diminishing marginal productivity”, which would grant positive profits 
because of the checks to public expenditure in the economies with a wide 
public intervention. 
FRATIANNI and SPINNELLI (1982) found a strong empirical evidence that 
the Italian public sector has grown more than the rest of the economy, both 
in relative and absolute terms. There is also strong evidence regarding the 
acceleration of the growth rates of public sector. Moreover, they show how 
the redistributive model is more suited to explain the evolution of the size 
of Italian Government (from 1861 to 1979) compared to the model with 
public goods and the hypothesis of sector-based interests. 
GROSSMAN (1987) described positively the State contributions to general 
economic growth soon after the birth of the State, advising however that 
public decision-making process would bring to continuous increases in ex-
penses, ending up in insufficient volumes of public goods. 
Making a distinction between two alternative visions in the domain of 
the economic analysis of Government theory – the Pigouvian one, which 
looks at the Government as a benevolent actor, trying to rectify lacks and 
excesses of a market without rules2; and the one typical of the “Public 
Choice School”, which on the contrary depicts the Government as a Levia-
than, instrument of special groups of interests, and generating distortions – 
GROSSMAN developed a model in which all the expenditures of the Gov-
ernment constitute inputs for production in the private sector, thus search-
ing the optimal size of Government able to maximize private output3. The 
estimate results show that in 1983 US public expenditure exceeded by 87% 
                                                 
2 See: PIGOU A.C., Public Finance, Macmillan, London, 1947. 
3 See: MUELLER D.C., Public Choice III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
– New York, 2003. 
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the value that would maximize private production. 
GRIER and TULLOCK (1989) completed an empirical work on OCSE 
countries between 1951 and 1980 noting that growth in the State size in 
countries having already a strongly interventionist Government has a sig-
nificantly negative effect on economic growth. 
TANZI and SCHUKNECHT (1997a; 1997b; 1998a; 1998b; 2007) analyzed 
the long-term dynamics of expenditure in industrialized countries. They 
came to the conclusion that countries with “small governments” do not 
usually show worse socio-economic and welfare indicators than those hav-
ing “big governments”. The first ones, providing just the essential services 
and a minimum of security and social protection to the needy, avoid run-
ning into the negative effects originated by the high taxation levels needed 
to guarantee a large-scale redistribution. They found out that in the cases in 
which public expenditure absorbs half the national income social progresses 
are not materially more consistent than anywhere else. 
YAVAS (1998) showed that an increase in the size of public sector rises 
the output level if the economy is characterized by a low level of aggregate 
per capita income, while reduces it when the economy produces a high level 
of per capita income. 
In developing countries a significant share of public expenditure is usu-
ally destined to the construction of infrastructures, thus stimulating the pri-
vate sector production. On the contrary, in mature economies the main 
share in the expenditure budget is destined to social services. 
GHALI (1998) and ANAMAN (2004) showed, by empirical research, that 
the public size can have a positive effect on economic activity due to posi-
tive external effects, the development of a favourable economic, administra-
tive and legal framework and the intervention in the case of market failures. 
On the contrary, BAJO-RUBIO (2000) pinpointed that the Government 
size has negative effects on economic growth, mainly because of bureau-
cratic inefficiency, excessive fiscal burden, distortion in the incentives sys-
tem and public intervention on the market. 
An analysis taking into account the different aims of public expenditure 
has been carried out by HEITGER (2001). He pointed out that governmental 
expenditures for “central” public goods (the Nozickian ones of minimal 
State: rule of law, security from external aggression, internal order) have a 
positive impact on economic growth4; while production and public supply 
                                                 
4 See also: BRUMM H.J., Military Spending, Government Disarray, and Economic 
Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis, in “Journal of Macroeconomics”, 19(4), 
1997, pp. 827-838; KENNEDY P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random 
House, New York, 1987. 
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of private goods have negative outcomes. Moreover, HEITGER remembered 
– as SMITH, RICARDO and MALTHUS5 had already done –, that the sound-
ness of public accounts forces the financing of massive public expenditures 
through more and more “oppressive” taxation levels, thus reducing incen-
tives to work, investment and innovation. 
FOLSTER and HENREKSON (2001) examined the effects of expenditure 
and fiscal withdrawal measures on growth rate in rich countries between 
1970 and 1995, finding a strong negative relation between public expendi-
ture and economic growth. 
ILLARIONOV and PIVAROVA (2002) studied the optimal size of Govern-
ment in OECD countries in the period 1960-2000, coming to the conclu-
sion that the rise of one percentage point in the share of public expenditure 
on GDP has come with a 0.1% reduction of the average growth rates of 
economic activity. Moreover, the two scholars subdivided their sample in 
several sub-samples in order to take into account individual heterogeneity 
(due to the presence of very different countries in the initial sample), using 
as proxy of public size two different criteria: the share of total public in-
comes as regards GDP and the share of total public expenditure on GDP. 
The set of independent variables included 46 potential regressors, classified 
according to their characteristics (geographical, climatic, demographic, ad-
ministrative, economic). The results showed that for both the dependent 
variables, the only relevant regressors were the per capita GDP (carrying a 
positive sign, thus confirming the “WAGNER’s Law”) and the annual aver-
age of population (carrying a negative sign). Grouping the various units in 
three more homogeneous groups, they noticed that the average share of 
public incomes on GDP for group 1 amounted to 37.5%, less than group 3, 
while the growth rates average in group 1 was more than thrice and a half 
the one in group 3. Finally, the two scholars calculated a “necessary level of 
public size” equal to 20.9% of the public expenditure share on GDP for less 
developed, highly populated countries (more than one million inhabitants). 
When such indicator reached ratios between 21% and 36%, the fiscal bur-
den was described as “irrational”, while over 36% it was described as “ex-
cessive”. 
AFONSO, SCHUKNECHT, and TANZI (2003), on the basis of ARMEY’s 
contribution, suggested that the general Government expenditure exceeding 
the ratio of 30% of the national income reduces economic growth and does 
not trigger, in practice, any improvement in social welfare. 
                                                 
5 See: ROMAGNOLI G.C., Le funzioni economiche dello stato in Italia, in ACOCELLA 
N., REY G.M., TIBERI M. (eds.), Saggi di politica economica in onore di Federico Caffè, vol. 
III, FrancoAngeli, Milan, 1999, pp. 171-200. 
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PEVCIN (2003; 2004; 2008) analyzed the presence of a “BARS curve” in 
twelve European countries with regard to the period 1950-1996, using – like 
VEDDER and GALLAWAY – the relationship between total public expendi-
ture and domestic product as a proxy of the Government size. The results 
show the evidence of a decreasing marginal productivity of public expendi-
ture. 
KUSTEPELI (2005) analyzed the size of Government in the twelve new 
countries that adhered to the EU and the two candidate ones6, referring to 
the period 1994-2001. The sample was initially subdivided into three 
groups, according to the average expenditure share on the GDP: low (26-
33%): Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Turkey and Romania; 
medium (34-40%): Slovakia, Cyprus, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovenia; high 
(41-47%): Malta, Hungary and Croatia. The results of the panel-type 
econometric analysis show that a smaller size of Government positively in-
fluences the economy’s growth rates. On the contrary, in relation to average 
ratios of this indicator, there is a diminution in the economic growth. 
In a recent essay, HILL (2008) criticized the model used by SCULLY 
(1996; 2003), through which the scholar determined the optimal taxation 
level for the United States of America in the thirty-year period 1960-1990 
equal to 19.3%. HILL’s critiques mainly concerned the peculiar form of the 
production function – to which SIEPER (1997) and KENNEDY (2000) had 
already objected – which includes the scarcely plausible assumption that all 
capital goods are completely consumed every year. Correcting this mistake, 
HILL found out that the size of Government able to maximize economic 
growth oscillates between 16% and 28%. 
MAGAZZINO (2008) estimated the “BARS curve” for Italy in two differ-
ent periods: in the first instance, using time-series which refer to the years 
between 1862 and 1998, the Government size maximizing the Italian eco-
nomic growth is given by a ratio between public expenditure and GDP 
equal to 23.06% (g* in Figure 1). The estimated value is in line with the one 
calculated by VEDDER and GALLAWAY (1998), equal to 22.23%. On the 
other hand, limiting the analysis to just the post-World War II period (1950-
1998), the public size associated to the maximum GDP growth rate results 
equal to 32.83%. This value is not noticeably different from the estimate of 
37.09% indicated in PEVCIN (2008). 
CHOBANOV and MLADENOVA (2009) examined the optimal size of Gov-
ernment (defined as the share of the total public expenditure on GDP) able 
to maximize economic growth for a set of 28 countries adhering to the 
                                                 
6 They are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. 
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OECD in the period 1970-2007. The empirical results showed that the ratio 
between public expenditure and optimal GDP equals to 25%. Moreover, all 
the countries in the sample were situated in the right descending part of the 
curve. 
MAGAZZINO (2009; 2010a; 2010b) pointed out how, in the framework of 
13 OECD countries examined, a country with a ratio between public ex-
penditure and GDP higher than 10% registers, on average, a reduction of its 
own GDP growth equal to 0.74%. Moreover, an increase in the variation of 
public expenditure equal to one percentage point corresponds approxi-
mately to a reduction in the acceleration rate of economic activity equal to 
0.31%. These results are particularly relevant in countries with a strong 
presence of the State in their economy, such as, in Europe, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, taking into account that the average 
share of public expenditure on GDP in 2008 was equal to 46.8% both for 
EU-16 and EU-27, and that the main international institutes – given the 
current severe economic and financial crisis and the consequent interven-
tions launched by the various governments to support real economy – ex-
pect that in 2009 both groups of countries will exceed 50%. 
Others researchers focused on fiscal policies and the relationship be-
tween public revenue and expenditure. BENSON and JOHNSON (1986) ob-
served the impact of taxation on the future formation of capital in various 
countries. They came to the conclusion that upward movements of relative 
tax shares bring about a reduction in the relative amount of investments; 
i.e., high taxation would trigger a low formation of capital. For this reason, 
as classical thought had already envisaged, excessive taxation can negatively 
influence economic activity, depressing demand. 
While investigating the effects of regional differences in the United 
States taxation, BESCI (1996) came to the conclusion that marginal rates of 
taxation show a statistically relevant negative relationship with economic 
growth. 
FELDTSEIN (1997), considering the US experience, pointed out how the 
appropriate size and role of Government depend, first of all, on the burden 
of fund transfers from the private sector. The size of this burden depends 
on the increases in fiscal shares and the welfare losses for the community 
on the whole due to higher fiscal shares. In conclusion, the central question 
of public finance is detected in the appropriate level of public expenditure 
and, consequently, taxation, particularly in those countries with a high pub-
lic debt/GDP ratio. The suitability of further increases in expenditure de-
pends on the comparison between its gains and total costs, including losses 
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caused by a rising revenue. Moreover, FELDSTEIN pinpointed the necessity 
to investigate more deeply the importance of the expectations mechanism 
on changes in the taxation shares, and the resulting effects on revenue. Fi-
nally, the lack in welfare associated to taxation reflects changes both in la-
bour supply and taxable base. Thus, he concluded that financing a further 
public expenditure of one dollar would require an increase in taxation of 
more than two dollars. 
Besides, FRIEDMAN (1997) had already noticed the essential role of the 
State as an actor of economic policy in the framework of a free open soci-
ety. However, he signalled that increasing the expenditure share on national 
income from 15% to 50% – and, thus, the share of withdrawal, in order to 
guarantee the budget balance – would be undoubtedly negative for the in-
come produced, generating a Paretian worsening. 
GWARTNEY, LAWSON, and HOLCOMBE (1998) considering a sample of 
23 OECD member countries, from 1960 to 1996, argued that the expansion 
of Government beyond its core functions has a negative influence on eco-
nomic growth for three reasons: a) the discouraging effects of high taxation 
and the crowding effect of public investments if compared to private ones; 
b) the diminution in profits coming from governmental intrusion in activi-
ties not appropriate to the public sector; c) the interference in the wealth-
generating process. 
Moreover, several studies has been centred on public expenditure pro-
ductivity and its efficiency levels. PEDEN and BRADLEY (1989) tried and 
measure the effect of public size on economic production and productivity 
in the United States of America between 1949 and 1985. They came to the 
conclusion that the level of Government activity in economy has a negative 
effect both at the level of aggregate production and growth rates; moreover, 
they found out that continuous increases in the shares of domestic product 
destined to the public sphere bring about a significant erosion of productiv-
ity. 
GUPTA et al. (2001) pointed out that the Government aim and size are 
optimal when the marginal social cost of public resources is equal to their 
marginal social benefit. However, they noticed that difficulties in the enact-
ment of such rule remain, turning it in an intellectually stimulating challenge 
for Costs-Benefits Analysis. 
Likewise, DAR and AMIRKHALKHALI (2002) came to the conclusion that 
the weaker the growth in the total factors and in capital productivity, the 
bigger is the size of the public apparatus. Studying 19 OCSE countries be-
tween 1971 and 1999, they found out that where the “small government” 
prevails, the efficiency degree, market discipline and use of resources are 
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superior, further to noticing the absence of crowding-out effects weakening 
the incentives in the investment of capital goods.  
ALESINA et al. (2002) analyzed the effects on investments of vast changes 
in fiscal policy. They found out that an increase in public expenditure – and, 
thus, in the size of the State apparatus – provokes an increase in labour 
costs in the private sector. Moreover, they found out that an increase in 
taxation reduces profits and investments, though an increase in public ex-
penditure would reduce them more. Thus, the conclusion they draw is that 
fiscal stabilizations able to promote economic growth are mainly associated 
to cuts in expenditures and not to tax burdens. 
POULSON and KAPLAN (2008) investigated the impact of tax policy on 
economic growth inside an endogenous growth model, where differences in 
policies can trigger different paths of long-term equilibrium growth. In line 
with the “LAFFER curve”, the analysis reveals that higher marginal shares 
have a negative impact on the various countries’ economy. Besides, a minor 
progressiveness of the taxation system has a positive impact on growth. 
States maintaining the rate of revenue increase under the rate of income in-
crease reach higher rates of economic growth. 
Recently, ALESINA and ARDAGNA (2009) examined the relationship be-
tween public deficit and economic growth, shedding light on episodes of 
large stances in fiscal policy, both in cases of fiscal stimuli and in that of fis-
cal adjustments in OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. Fiscal stimuli based 
upon tax cuts are more likely to increase growth than those based upon 
spending increases. As for fiscal adjustments those based upon spending 
cuts and no tax increases are more likely to reduce deficits and debt over 
GDP ratios than those based upon tax increases. In addition, adjustments 
on the spending side rather than on the tax side are less likely to create re-
cessions. 
While, REINHART and ROGOFF (2010) study economic growth and infla-
tion at different levels of government and external debt. Their more rele-
vant findings include the fact that the relationship between government 
debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold 
of 90 percent of GDP; emerging markets face lower thresholds for external 
debt (public and private); there is no apparent contemporaneous link be-
tween inflation and public debt levels for the advanced countries as a group. 
 
3. – Econometric modelling and data 
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The estimate methods used in this research are typical of the time-series and 
panel type econometric analysis. 
Concerning the time-series analyses, the ARIMAX (AutoRegressive Inte-
grated Moving Average with Exogenous Variables)7 models were used, together 
with NEWEY and WEST’s correction regarding heteroscedasticity8 and 
KALMAN’s filter for data filtering9. 
Panel-type analyses, instead, were conducted through FE (Fixed Effects), 
BE (Between Effects), RE (Random Effects), FEMAR (Fixed Effect Models with 
an AR(1) Disturbances), REMAR (Random Effect Models with an AR(1) Distur-
bances), PFGLS (Panel Feasible Generalized Least Squares), PCSE (Panel PRAIS-
WINSTEN Regression), and PGEE (Population-Averaged Panel-data Models) 
models10. 
The data used in this work were provided by AMECO11 database and 
Total Economy Database12, freely consultable on the internet. 
In Table 1 variables of the model are summed up. 
 
                                                 
7 For a detailed analysis of the time-series modelling used see, among others: 
LÜTKEPOHL H., New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, Springer-Verlag, 
Milan, 2005; DAGUM B.E., Analisi delle serie storiche: modellistica, previsione e scomposi-
zione, Springer-Verlag, Milan, 2002; ENGLE R.F. (ed.), ARCH. Selected Readings, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 1995; HAMILTON J.D., Time Series Analysis, Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, 1994. 
8 See: NEWEY W.K., WEST K.D. (1987), A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix, in “Econometrica”, Vol. 55, pp. 
703-708; WHITE H., A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a di-
rect test for heteroskedasticity, in “Econometrica”, 48, 1980, pp. 817-838. 
9 See: KALMAN R.E., A new approach to linear filtering and prediction problems, in 
“Journal of Basic Engineering”, Transactions of the ASME, Series D, 82, 1960, pp. 
35-45. 
10 For a detailed analysis of the panel modelling used see, among others: 
BALTAGI B.H., Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, Wiley, New York, 2005; HSIAO 
C., Analysis of Panel Data, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003; 
WOOLDRIDGE J.M., Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2002; BALTAGI B.H., WU P. X., Unequally spaced panel data regressions with 
AR(1) disturbances, in “Econometric Theory”, 15, 1999, pp. 814-823; MUNDLAK Y., 
On the pooling of time series and cross section data, in “Econometrica”, 46, 1978, pp. 69-
85. 
11 See the website: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/. 
12 See the website:http://www.conference-board.org/economics/database.cfm. 
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Table 1 – List of variables. 
Variable Explanation 
TGDPGK Total GDP, in millions of 1990 US$ (converted at Geary-Khamis PPPs) 
CATEGG Cyclically adjusted total expenditure of general government, % GDP 
Sources: AMECO and TED database. 
 
In Table 2 some preliminary descriptive statistics are shown. 
 
Table 2 – Exploratory data analysis. 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Range 
TGDPGK 258006.5 96097 369505.5 1.9304 5.7864 1716872.9 
CATEGG 46.1405 45.6866 6.9494 0.1881 2.7092 41.5205 
Sources: our calculations. 
 
In Table A (in Appendix) we report results of stationarity tests carried on 
these two time-series, while in Table B correlation coefficients between real 
GDP and the share of public expenditure is shown. In general, both va-
riables are non-stationary at levels, but they become stationary at first dif-
ferences; so we can conclude that real GDP and public expenditure are I(1) 
processes. 
 
4. – The estimates 
First we examine the relationship between economic growth and public ex-
penditure following the analyses carried out in ILLARIONOV and PIVAROVA 
(2002), SCULLY (2004), PEVCIN (2004) and CHOBANOV and MLADENOVA 
(2005), estimating three fundamental relationships. The first one investi-
gates the relation between the growth rate of the aggregate product and the 
expenditure share as regards the GDP. The estimated equation belongs to 
the type: 
 
d(TGDPGK)i,t = α + β1 CATEGG i,t + ui,t [1] 
 
The dependent variable (TGDPGK) represents the GDP growth rate at 
constant prices (converted in GEARY-KHAMIS P.P.P.), while the explanatory 
(CATEGG) consists in the total public expenditure of the general Govern-
ment, corrected according to the trend of the economic cycle. We expect 
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that an excessive size of the Government trigger negative effects on eco-
nomic growth. 
The second relationship we studied concerns the link between the 
growth rate of the aggregate product, the expenditure share as regards the 
GDP and the variation of public expenditure. The estimated equation be-
longs to the type: 
 
d(TGDPGK)i,t = α + β1 CATEGG i,t + β2 d(CATEGG i,t) + ui,t [2] 
 
In this case, we expect that, given the excessive size of the Government, 
further increase in public expenditure triggers new negative effects on eco-
nomic growth. 
The third relationship analyzes the link between the variation rate of 
economic growth and the variation of the expenditure share as regards the 
GDP. The estimated equation is: 
 
d2(CATEGG)i,t = α + β1 d(CATEGG i,t) + ui,t [3] 
 
In this case, too, an increase in public expenditure can trigger a check to 
the economic growth dynamics. 
We then estimate the relationships between economic growth rate and 
public expenditure according to the specification suggested by VEDDER and 
GALLAWAY (1998), PEVCIN (2004), CHOBANOV and MLADENOVA (2005) 
and DAVIES (2008). It assumes that the growth rate of aggregate income is 
the positive function of the public expenditure share on domestic product 
and the negative function of the square of the public expenditure share; ini-
tially we estimate the following model: 
 
d(TGDPGK)i,t = α + β1 CATEGG t + β2 CATEGG
 2
i,t + ui,t [4] 
 
with the i index standing for the country (i=Austria, …), while the t one re-
ferring to the period (t=1970,…, 2009). The dependent variable is the real 
GDP growth rate corrected according to the impact of the factors of com-
merce (measured at constant prices), TGDPGK, while the independent vari-
ables are the public expenditure share corrected according to the economic 
cycle trend on real GDP, CATEGG, and its square value, CATEGG2. For 
every series the logarithmic transformed counts were calculated. 
We expect that the linear term, CATEGG carry a positive sign and show 
the positive effects of public expenditure on economic growth; on the con-
trary, the square term CATEGG2 should take a negative sign, as it measures 
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the negative effects associated to the enlargement of public sector. In other 
words, this second degree term should stand for the decreasing marginal 
productivity of public expenditure. 
The government expenditure as a share of GDP that maximizes eco-
nomic growth from the quadratic function above is found to be the follow-
ing after differentiating the TGDPGK with respect to CATEGG: 
 
CATEGG *= -b/2c [5] 
 
BALTAGI13 lists several benefits from using panel data. These include the 
following: 
1) Controlling for individual heterogeneity, panel data suggests that 
countries are heterogeneous. Panel data are able to control for these 
state- and time-invariant variables whereas a time-series study or a 
cross-section study cannot. 
2) Panel data give more informative data, more variability, less colli-
nearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more ef-
ficiency. 
3) Panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment. 
4) Panel data are better able to identify and measure effects that are 
simply not detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. 
We use time-series regressions and we use dummy variables to take into 
account specific country and time effects, but also robust standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity or serial correlation. 
 
4.1 – Time-series analysis of the relationship between economic 
growth and size of Government 
In order to study the relationship between public expenditure and economic 
growth, we used a dataset for 27 countries members of the European Union 
(Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and UK) from 1970 to 2009. First we con-
ducted an econometric analysis for time-series data of the countries with 
enough yearly data. 
The negative relationship between economic growth rate and public ex-
                                                 
13 See: BALTAGI B.H., Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, …, cit. 
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penditure is clearly evident from Table 3. The coefficient of the explanatory 
variable is statistically relevant for every country but Denmark, and it has a 
negative sign. Regarding the determination coefficient, public expenditure 
alone explains from 19% (United Kingdom) to 86% (Greece) of the ratio of 
growth rate variability. Residuals are never correlated, and for each country 
they are White Noise (W.N.). 
GRANGER causality tests show that we have a bi-directional causality for 
three countries (Belgium, France, and Ireland). Instead, GDP Granger-
causes public expenditure for Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy. 
On the contrary, for Belgium, Denmark, France and Ireland empirical re-
sults support the opposite hypothesis, since the direction of causality moves 
from public expenditure to aggregate income. The inverse causality found 
for Italy may have an explanation in the fact that social public expenditures 
were planned structurally assuming a rate of GDP growth that actually did 
not came out. On the other hand, the reason for the lack of econometric 
evidence for a causal relation between the expansion of public spending and 
the reduction of the growth rate might be that expansion was largely fi-
nanced through public debt, and that a share of it, for a period, was ab-
sorbed by the central bank. Only later, when the burden of the high debt 
did appear in the budget via high expenditures for interest and high tax 
burden became necessary, the negative effect of big Government on the 
rate of GDP growth emerged. 
Regarding Table 4, the growth rate is estimated as a function of the pub-
lic expenditure share on GDP and its series in first differences. The results 
previously shown are confirmed; in fact, public expenditure still has a nega-
tive sign in almost all countries (just Greece is the exception). The series to 
first differences, carry a negative sign and a strong statistical significance 
(everywhere). The R2 fluctuates between 40% (Germany) and 89% (France). 
Just in the cases of France and Germany residuals do not follow a Gaussian 
trend, while for every country they are serially uncorrelated, thus being a 
W.N. 
In Table 5, conversely, we regress the variation in the GDP growth rate, 
i.e. the acceleration or deceleration of aggregate growth (d2TGDPGK) on 
the difference of the public expenditure share on GDP. Again, there is a 
negative relationship between economic growth and public expenditure. 
The independent variable has the expected negative sign and is statistically 
relevant in twelve out of thirteen countries (the only exception being Den-
mark, as before). The coefficient of determination fluctuates from a mini-
mum of 19% (United Kingdom) to a maximum of 80% (Italy) of the 
growth rate variability. Regression’ residuals seem to be normally distributed 
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(except for Germany). Finally, in every case the residuals appear serially un-
correlated. 
The time-series analysis show that the optimal size of public expenditure 
in relation to the GDP growth rate maximization (G*) differs from country 
to country: from 35.4% from Belgium to 44.5% for Ireland (Table 6). 
As shown in Table 7, for all the countries here considered the maximum 
of the BARS curve are situated in the right part of them. The peak of the 
BARS curve varies among the considered countries with a difference of 9 
points between the lowest level (35.39) and the highest level (44.47). In the 
lowest range we find Belgium and The Netherlands; in the highest range 
there are Ireland and UK. The former is the country with the minimum de-
viation from its ratio of public expenditure on GDP that maximizes GDP 
growth: only 2.27%. It is followed by Luxembourg with 2.30 points. Ire-
land, together with Luxembourg, it is also the country with the highest ratio 
of public spending consistent with its growth maximization. The difference 
between the actual level of public expenditure and the level consistent with 
maximization of GDP growth rate, with the exception of these two cases, 
ranges between 5.7 points for Germany and 18.1 points for Belgium. 
 
Figure 2 – Relation between per capita GDP and public expenditure, (EU-27, 
2009). 
 
Source: our elaborations on AMECO and TED data. 
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Table 3 – Relations between economic growth rate and public expenditure in some countries adhering to EU-27 (1970-2009). 
Indipendent 
Variables 
 Dependent Variable: d(TGDPGK) 
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA GER GRE IRL ITA PBS POR UK 
Constant .0749 
** 
(.0332) 
.0772 
*** 
(.0171) 
.0163 
 
(.0265) 
.1563 
*** 
(.0424) 
.0487 
* 
(.0262) 
.1296 
*** 
(.0450) 
.1695 
** 
(.0703) 
.0994 
*** 
(.0165) 
.1269 
*** 
(.0336) 
.0634 
*** 
(.0218) 
.0790 
*** 
(.0237) 
.0655 
** 
(.0266) 
CATEGG -.0230 
** 
(.0108) 
-.0239 
*** 
(.0056) 
-.0040 
 
(.0086) 
-.0501 
*** 
(.0136) 
-.0150 
* 
(.0086) 
-.0426 
*** 
(.0151) 
-.0557 
** 
(.0238) 
-.0302 
*** 
(.0054) 
-.0422 
*** 
(.0120) 
-.0193 
*** 
(.0072) 
-.0259 
*** 
(.0083) 
-.0215 
** 
(.0093) 
Log-
likelihood 
151.199 158.552 161.501 124.988 157.182 164.638 81.160 96.957 144.037 184.960 139.740 161.911 
Wald χ2 4.54 18.23 31.64 59.53 8.61 117.18 9.85 546.49 58.65 13.20 56.44 6.89 
R2 0.5082 0.4594 0.3757 0.5215 0.7578 0.3170 0.8590 0.4168 - 0.5658 0.7633 0.1880 
ARIMA 
ARCH 
Corrections 
- MA(1) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) MA(1) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) 
ARCH(1) 
MA(1) MA(1) AR(1) 
BIC 291.908 302.450 304.813 235.870 300.629 310.959 150.143 280.400 271.238 355.164 265.617 309.167 
SW W Test (0.5241) (0.3828) (0.5034) (0.5884) (0.7445) (0.0500) (0.4487) (0.0286) (0.8900) (0.9593) (0.4804) (0.0931) 
LB Q Test (0.9252) (0.5923) (0.4508) (0.4075) (0.3360) (0.8710) (0.4963) (0.3402) (0.0973) (0.8884) (0.5494) (0.2946) 
Granger- 
causality 
- → 
← 
← - → 
← 
→ - → 
← 
→ - - - 
N.B.: Newey-West HAC estimator and Kalman filter applied. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brack-
ets. → Granger causality exists only from the dependent towards the independent variable. ← Granger causality exists only from the indepen-
dent towards the dependent variable. 
Source: our calculations on AMECO and TED data. 
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Table 4 – Relationships among economic growth rate, public expenditure and first differences in expenditure in some countries adhering to EU-27 
(1970-2009). 
Indipendent 
Variables 
 Dependent Variable: d(TGDPGK) 
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA GER GRE IRL ITA PBS POR UK 
Constant .0321 
 
(.0348) 
.0904 
*** 
(.0183) 
.0198 
 
(.0242) 
.0446 
*** 
(.0094) 
.0646 
*** 
(.0145) 
.1405 
*** 
(.0526) 
-.0755 
 
(.0886) 
.0663 
*** 
(.0129) 
.0262 
 
(.0268) 
.0676 
** 
(.0289) 
.0442 
 
(.0349) 
.0314 
** 
(.0152) 
CATEGG -.0090 
 
(.0113) 
-.0275 
*** 
(.0061) 
-.0051 
 
(.0078) 
-.0126 
*** 
(.0031) 
-.0200 
*** 
(.0047) 
-.0462 
*** 
(.0176) 
.0277 
 
(.0303) 
-.0197 
*** 
(.0045) 
-.0078 
 
(.0089) 
-.0207 
** 
(.0095) 
-.0137 
 
(.0121) 
-.0095 
* 
(.0052) 
d(CATEGG) -.0535 
*** 
(.0215) 
-.0582 
*** 
(.0201) 
-.0799 
*** 
(.0155) 
-.1261 
*** 
(.0091) 
-.0883 
*** 
(.0111) 
-.0735 
*** 
(.0279) 
-.0459 
** 
(.0188) 
-.0902 
*** 
(.0177) 
-.0341 
*** 
(.0085) 
-.0476 
** 
(.0185) 
-.0252 
* 
(.0143) 
-.0482 
*** 
(.0146) 
Log-
likelihood 
150.028 178.984 162.571 21298.80 164.370 163.023 73.218 80.275 143.433 184.224 136.637 181.939 
R2 0.6027 0.6658 0.5310 - 0.8930 0.4037 0.8000 0.5420 0.8749 0.6443 0.7819 0.4879 
ARIMA 
ARCH 
Corrections 
- AR(1) 
MA(1) 
- AR(1) 
MA(1) 
ARCH(1) 
- AR(1) 
MA(1) 
MA(1) AR(1) MA(1) AR(1) MA(1) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
BIC 286.194 336.142 310.698 283.945 315.135 304.221 131.457 144.872 270.205 350.129 256.104 342.052 
SW W Test (0.7536) (0.8233) (0.0428) (0.5881) (0.3107) (0.0000) (0.4201) (0.3406) (0.7518) (0.7971) (0.9645) (0.0157) 
LB Q Test (0.9958) (0.7022) (0.9232) (0.7091) (0.7835) (0.9336) (0.2604) (0.8864) (0.6059) (0.9929) (0.3579) (0.8614) 
N.B.: Newey-West HAC estimator and Kalman filter applied. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brack-
ets. 
Source: our calculations on AMECO and TED data. 
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Table 5 – Relationships between variation of economic growth rate and first differences in public expenditure in some countries adhering to EU-27 
(1970-2009). 
Indipendent 
Variables 
 Dependent Variable: d2(TGDPGK) 
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA GER GRE IRL ITA PBS POR UK 
Constant -.0001 
 
(.0002) 
.0000 
 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
 
(.0005) 
.0003 
 
(.0008) 
.0001 
 
(.0003) 
.0001 
 
(.0005) 
.0003 
 
(.0003) 
-.0008 
 
(.0006) 
.0000 
 
(.0004) 
-.0001 
 
(.0003) 
.0002 
 
(.0007) 
.0000 
 
(.0005) 
d(CATEGG) -.0452 
* 
(.0257) 
-.0638 
** 
(.0322) 
-.0293 
 
(.0259) 
-.0642 
*** 
(.0250) 
-.0510 
*** 
(.0188) 
-.0889 
*** 
(.0265) 
-.0544 
*** 
(.0179) 
-.0633 
*** 
(.0174) 
-.0605 
*** 
(.0156) 
-.0592 
*** 
(.0160) 
-.0476 
* 
(.0271) 
-.0430 
* 
(.0228) 
Log-
likelihood 
142.823 148.475 133.114 135.37 132.688 153.183 94.942 91.220 138.806 180.063 131.327 167.596 
Wald χ2 24.31 96.29 49.29 42.48 12.45 23.90 32.02 28.23 40.41 33.99 46.49 25.11 
R2 0.5380 0.4536 0.3692 0.4713 0.5257 0.3230 0.8874 0.4354 0.8023 0.5912 0.7177 0.1861 
ARIMA 
ARCH 
Corrections 
AR(2) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) AR(1) AR(2) AR(1) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) 
MA(1) 
BIC 268.318 278.763 248.174 253.251 251.770 291.815 174.906 169.899 260.952 345.471 245.485 317.003 
SW W Test (0.2714) (0.0733) (0.0214) (0.5664) (0.5192) (0.0600) (0.5711) (0.2207) (0.2219) (0.0145) (0.0105) (0.0439) 
LB Q Test (0.9150) (0.3805) (0.2225) (0.5966) (0.3641) (0.7068) (0.8033) (0.4613) (0.3749) (0.9375) (0.4108) (0.5501) 
N.B.: Newey-West HAC estimator and Kalman filter applied. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brack-
ets. 
Source: our calculations on AMECO and TED data. 
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Table 6 – “BARS curve” in some countries adhering to EU-27 (1970-2009). 
Indipendent 
Variables 
 Dependent Variable: d(TGDPGK) 
AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA GER GRE IRL ITA PBS POR UK 
Constant 5.0870 
*** 
(.0554) 
.6598 
*** 
(.0000) 
2.2004 
*** 
(.1971) 
-.9094 
*** 
(.0000) 
-3.1221 
*** 
(.0000) 
-1.8816 
*** 
(.0000) 
4.3571 
*** 
(.0000) 
-.7677 
** 
(.3208) 
.9400 
** 
(.3896) 
1.0941 
 
(.0009) 
-2.0833 
*** 
(.3797) 
-.3547 
*** 
(.0000) 
CATEGG 1.8006 
*** 
(.0184) 
.1951 
*** 
(.0085) 
.7993 
*** 
(.0755) 
.3718 
*** 
(.0255) 
1.2007 
*** 
(.0165) 
.8490 
*** 
(.0299) 
1.6564 
*** 
(.0322) 
.4118 
*** 
(.1363) 
.3215 
** 
(.1502) 
.3272 
*** 
(.0152) 
-.9568 
*** 
(.1527) 
.1857 
*** 
(.0177) 
CATEGG2 -2.3563 
*** 
(.0216) 
-.2756 
*** 
(.0065) 
-1.0346 
*** 
(.0954) 
-.4604 
*** 
(.0193) 
-1.5202 
*** 
(.0125) 
1.0109 
*** 
(.0226) 
-2.1060 
*** 
(.0238) 
-.4630 
*** 
(.1652) 
-.4266 
** 
(.1896) 
-.4605 
*** 
(.0114) 
-1.1315 
*** 
(.1892) 
-.2134 
*** 
(.0134) 
N 34 40 39 35 32 39 22 25 30 41 33 40 
Log-
likelihood 
152.365 176.540 163.332 142.685 158.389 164.918 98.645 100.176 143.544 189.399 110.492 179.847 
R2 0.5418 0.5180 - 0.5803 0.7756 0.3278 0.8787 0.5522 0.8231 - 0.8029 0.2710 
ARIMA 
ARCH 
Corrections 
AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) 
MA(1) 
ARCH(1) 
MA(1) MA(1) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
AR(1) 
MA(1) 
MA(1) MA(1) AR(1) 
MA(1) 
ARCH(1) 
MA(1) MA(1) 
BIC 283.750 334.762 301.201 271.264 303.042 311.517 182.066 178.106 270.252 356.664 203.6543 345.040 
SW W Test (0.5241) (0.382) (0.9875) (0.4829) (0.7445) (0.0000) (0.4541) (0.2431) (0.9057) (0.8938) (0.2504) (0.0225) 
LB Q Test (0.9252) (0.5923) (0.5198) (0.4255) (0.3360) (0.9277) (0.1653) (0.9507) (0.5805) (0.7964) (0.0692) (0.7114) 
Curve peak 38.21% 35.39% 38.63% 40.38% 39.49% 41.99% 39.33% 44.47% 37.68% 35.52% 42.28% 43.50% 
N.B.: Newey-West HAC estimator and Kalman filter applied. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brack-
ets. 
Source: our calculations on AMECO and TED data. 
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Table 7 – Possible margins for public expenditure reduction in some countries of EU-27. 
Country Size of government 
(% of GDP, 2009) 
“BARS curve” 
optimum 
(% of GDP) 
Percentage 
change in spend-
ing as a share of 
GDP 
Austria 52.24 38.21 -14.03 
Belgium 53.48 35.39 -18.09 
Denmark 55.41 38.63 -16.78 
Finland 54.07 40.38 -13.69 
France 55.15 39.49 -15.66 
Germany 46.02 41.99 -5.65 
Greece 49.97 39.33 -10.64 
Ireland 46.74 44.47 -2.27 
Italy 51.52 37.68 -13.84 
Luxembourg 42.08 39.78 -2.31 
The Netherlands 49.01 35.52 -13.49 
Portugal 51.54 42.28 -9.26 
UK 51.17 43.50 -7.67 
Source: our calculations on AMECO and TED data. 
 
The marked differences in the peaks of the BARS curves of these coun-
tries may depend from several factors, ranging from the different composi-
tion of the public expenditures; to the different degrees of efficiency of the 
public spending process; and from the way of financing them to the differ-
ent degrees of tax evasion which increases the burden of those who do not 
evade. Different economic structures and institutions and different levels of 
per capita GDP might affect the capability of growth. A panel analysis may 
help the goal more in detail, while broadening the number of the states un-
der consideration. 
 
4.2 – Panel Analysis of the relationship between economic growth and 
Government size 
The estimates of regression models for panel data essentially depend on hy-
potheses regarding the intercept, coefficients and error terms. 
The first and more simple approach consists in analyzing the relationship 
between economic growth rate and public expenditure (measured as aggre-
gate income share) and its first differences. Following the works of VEDDER 
and GALLAWAY (1998), ILLARIONOV and PIVAVORA (2002), PEVCIN (2004), 
DAVIES (2008), CHOBANOV and MLADENOVA (2009) the GLS-RE ap-
proach was used, with AR(1)-type disturbances. As it is pointed out in Table 
8, the coefficient of the explanatory variable CATEGG in the first column 
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indicates that a country having a 10% higher public expenditure records a 
decrease in its GDP growth equal to 2.1%. Public expenditure alone can 
explain more than 22% of the differences in growth rate among the 27 
countries considered, during the reference period. 
Moreover, economic growth is negatively correlated with the variation in 
public expenditure, thus reinforcing the negative effect that the increase in 
Government size can trigger on economic growth. The empirical evidence 
found suggests that big Governments impose big penalties upon their peo-
ple, in the form of more limited GDP growth rates. Thus, reductions in the 
growth rate of economic activity are more accentuated in countries showing 
a strong public intervention in their economies. In fact, the results in the 
third column of Table 6 show that an increase of one percentage point in 
the public expenditure variation corresponds approximately to a reduction 
of 0.04% in the acceleration rate of economic growth. 
 
Table 8 – Relationships between public expenditure and GDP growth, GLS-RE ap-
proach (EU-27, 1970-2009). 
Indipendent 
variable 
Dependent variable 
d(TGDPGK) d2(TGDPGK) 
Constant .0677*** 
(.0069) 
.0589*** 
(.0069) 
-.0003 
(.0003) 
CATEGG -.0208*** 
(.0023) 
-.0178*** 
(.0024) 
- 
d(CATEGG) - -.0335*** 
(.0044) 
-.0402*** 
(.0056) 
Number of obs. 593 569 566 
Number of groups 27 27 27 
R2overall 0.2259 0.3071 0.0839 
Wald χ2 78.8103 
(0.0000) 
138.3321 
(0.0000) 
51.0725 
(0.0000) 
ARIMA 
Correction 
AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) 
estimated .2914 .2771 -.1985 
(Σu; Σe) (.0016; .0041) (.0015; .0038) (0; .0050) 
(θmin; θmax) (.2683; 0.4903) (.2807; .5210) (0; 0) 
Baltagi-Wu LBI 
test 
1.4561 1.4904 2.3594 
Bhargava et al. 
DW M test 
1.2352 1.2642 2.1412 
N.B.: Correzione di White per l’eteroschedasticità – Procedura di stima a 2 stadi per la 
correlazione. Livelli di significatività: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
In parentesi, per le variabili, vengono riportati gli Standard Errors Robusti. 
 
In Table 9, instead, the results of the “BARS curve” estimates for the 
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EU-27 countries are reported, in the specification of equation [4]. As we 
can see, using four different approaches (fixed effects models with an AR(1) 
factor, generalized estimate equations, PRAIS-WINSTEN for panel data and 
Generalized Least Squares for panel data) we reach a complete empirical 
evidence showing the existence of a “BARS curve” for this group of coun-
tries. The five models pinpoint a point of maximum of the curve between 
35.6% and 37.3%, in any case much below both the average value (47.9%) 
and the median one(47.6%) registered for the group in 2009, thus in any 
case policy implications suggest an expenditure reduction. 
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Table 9 – “BARS curve” for EU-27 (1970-2009). 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(d(TGDPGK) 
Fixed Effects 
with AR(1) 
Disturbances 
GEE 
Population-
Averaged 
Prais-
Winsten 
(PCSEs) 
Panel 
C-S T-S 
FGLS 
POLS 
Driscoll-
Kraay SE 
Constant .6042*** 
(.1395) 
.6201** 
(.2542) 
.7924*** 
(.1620) 
.6068*** 
(.1407) 
.6183*** 
(.1781) 
CATEGG .1946** 
(.0784) 
.2015** 
(.0973) 
.2634*** 
(.0615) 
.1918*** 
(.0547) 
.2033*** 
(.0688) 
CATEGG2 -.2645*** 
(.0979) 
-.2729** 
(.1233) 
-.3537*** 
(.0782) 
-.2629*** 
(.0689) 
-.2738*** 
(.0868) 
AR Correction 1 1 1 1 - 
Number of 
obs. 
593 593 593 593 593 
Number of 
groups 
27 27 27 27 27 
Wald χ2 23.1670 (a) 
(0.0000) 
75.0533 
(0.0000) 
83.5109 
(0.0000) 
151.6166 
(0.0207) 
26.28 (a) 
(0.0000) 
Log-likelihood 2338.3319 - - - - 
R2 0.2519 - 0.3529 - 0.2467 
BIC -4657.648 - - - - 
AIC -4670.664 - - - - 
estimated .2920 - .02713 - - 
Scale 
Parameter 
- .0000 - - - 
Baltagi-Wu 
LBI test 
1.4553 - - - - 
Bhargava et al. 
DW M test 
1.2393 - - - - 
Curve peak 36.78% 36.92% 37.29% 35.62% 37.12% 
Mean 
CATEGG (b) 
47.90% 
Median 
CATEGG (b) 
47.64% 
N.B.: White correction for heteroscedasticity; (a) F Stat.; (b) in 2009. Significance lev-
els:* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
Since EU-27 is not a homogeneous panel, we choose to estimate some 
sub-groups of countries, arranged on the basis of common history or Wel-
fare State’ similarities. Then, as in KUSTEPELI (2005) and HAKRO (2009), we 
break up the panel into different groups, homogeneous according to differ-
ent characteristics; from the point of view of the welfare model: Anglo-
Saxon countries, Eastern European, Central European, Scandinavian and 
Mediterranean; from the point of view of per capita income, determining 
four subgroups (or quartiles) in which the value of the per capita GDP is 
not too dissimilar; the Euro-area, in order to test the presence of a “BARS 
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curve” for EMU countries. 
Concerning the Anglo-Saxon countries, we find a clear empirical evi-
dence in favour of the presence of the curve. Both the estimate methods 
used produce an optimal share of public expenditure between 3 to 6 p.p. 
lower than the 2009 one. The analysis of the cross-sectional dependence 
shows that the errors are not identically and independently distributed 
(ε~i.i.d.) for both variables (see Table 10)14. 
 
Table 10 – “BARS curve” for Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland, Malta, and the United 
Kingdom, 1970-2009). 
Dependent Variable: 
(d(TGDPGK) 
Between WLS with 
Bootstrap 
GEE 
Population-Averaged 
Constant 9.1454*** 
(3.4361) 
-.4326* 
(.2306) 
CATEGG 4.1034** 
(1.5152) 
.2378** 
(.1032) 
CATEGG2 -4.8892*** 
(1.8155) 
-.2654** 
(.1233) 
Number of observations 61 61 
Number of groups 3 3 
Wald χ2 7.46 
(0.0240) 
5.31 
(0.0212) 
Log-likelihood 13.1751 - 
R2 0.0388 (a) - 
Scale Parameter - .0000 
Friedman C S I test 50.387 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
22.242 (0.0000) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 41.96% 44.80% 
Mean CATEGG (b) 47.88% 
Median CATEGG (b) 46.74% 
N.B.: White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) R2overall; (b) in 2009. Significance 
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
Also in the case of Eastern European countries we find the presence of 
                                                 
14 See: SARAFIDIS V., DE HOYOS R.E., On testing for cross sectional dependence in 
panel data models, University of Cambridge, Mimeo, 2006; FREES E.W., Longitudinal 
and Panel Data: Analysis and Applications in Social Sciences, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2004; PESARAN M.H., General diagnostic tests for cross section depend-
ence in panels, in “Cambridge Working Papers in Economics”, University of Cam-
bridge, Faculty of Economics, No. 0435, 2004; FREES E.W., Assessing cross-sectional 
correlations in panel data, in “Journal of Econometrics”, 69, 1995, pp. 393-414; 
FRIEDMAN M., The use of ranks to avoid the assumption of normality implicit in the analysis 
of variance, in “Journal of the American Statistical Association”, 32, 1937, pp. 675-
701. 
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the “BARS curve”, using five different estimate methods. Here, the optimal 
expenditure share equals to approximately 40%, more than 4 p.p. below the 
average of 2009. For these countries, as well, the two variables show the 
presence of cross-correlation (Table 11). 
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Table 11 – “BARS curve” for Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 1970-
2009). 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(d(TGDPGK) 
Fixed Ef-
fects with 
AR(1) 
Distur-
bances 
Random Ef-
fects with 
AR(1) 
Disturbances 
Prais-
Winsten 
(PCSEs) 
Panel 
C-S T-S 
FGLS 
GEE 
Population-
Averaged 
Constant 2.5156*** 
(.5243) 
1.8294*** 
(.5346) 
1.8012*** 
(.5008) 
1.4758*** 
(.3642) 
1.7254*** 
(.6925) 
CATEGG .9936*** 
(.3019) 
.7224*** 
(.2237) 
.7113*** 
(.2033) 
.5726*** 
(.1502) 
.6786*** 
(.2767) 
CATEGG2 -1.2428*** 
(.3681) 
-.9031*** 
(.2738) 
-.8892*** 
(.2518) 
-.7204*** 
(.1848) 
-.8497*** 
(.3448) 
AR Correction 1 1 1 1 1 
Number of obs. 127 137 137 137 137 
Number of 
groups 
10 10 10 10 10 
Wald χ2 11.28 (a) 
(0.0000) 
21.85 (a) 
(0.0001) 
15.37 
(0.0005) 
28.28 
(0.0000) 
6.51 
(0.0385) 
Log-likelihood 492.1495 - - - - 
R2 0.1640 (b) 0.1627 (c) 0.1491 - - 
RMSE - - .0053 - - 
BIC -969.766 - - - - 
AIC -978.299 - - - - 
estimated .2664 .2664 .3722 - - 
(Σu; Σe) (.0031; 
.0053) 
(.0011; .0053) - - - 
(θmin; θmax) - (.1219; .1465) - - - 
Scale 
Parameter 
- - - - 0.0000 
Baltagi-Wu 
LBI test 
1.5078 1.5078 - - - 
Bhargava et al. 
DW M test 
1.1936 1.1936 - - - 
Friedman C S I 
test 
65.586 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
23.935 (0.0044) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 39.98% 39.99% 40.00% 39.74% 39.94% 
Mean 
CATEGG (b) 
44.11% 
Median 
CATEGG (b) 
44.43% 
N.B.: White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) F Stat.; (b) in 2009. Significance le-
vels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
Regarding Central European countries, we find once again a strong em-
pirical evidence supporting the curve. Moreover, in this case, while the op-
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timal expenditure curve is attested between 37% and 39%, the average in 
2009 was equal to 47%, pointing out the need for a reduction of the expen-
diture share in the aggregate income almost equal to 10 p.p. The two vari-
ables show once again the presence of cross-dependence (Table 12). 
 
Table 12 – “BARS curve” for Central European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, 1970-2009). 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(d(TGDPGK) 
Between 
WLS with 
Jackknife 
Random Ef-
fects with 
AR(1) 
Disturbances 
Prais-
Winsten 
(PCSEs) 
Panel 
C-S T-S 
FGLS 
GEE 
Population-
Averaged 
Constant 3.2934*** 
(.8116) 
1.0322*** 
(.3768) 
.7667** 
(.3834) 
.7323** 
(.3235) 
1.3096*** 
(.3577) 
CATEGG 1.2489*** 
(.3226) 
.3558** 
(.1469) 
.2503* 
(.1429) 
.2371* 
(.1242) 
.4605*** 
(.1383) 
CATEGG2 1.5889*** 
(.4030) 
-.4704** 
(.1850) 
-.3385* 
(.1832) 
-.3217** 
(.1573) 
-.6039*** 
(.1747) 
AR Correction - - 1 1 1 
Number of obs. 226 226 226 226 226 
Number of 
groups 
7 7 7 7 7 
Wald χ2 119.61 (a) 
(0.0000) 
137.58 
(0.0000) 
35.81 
(0.0000) 
57.37 
(0.0000) 
281.32 
(0.0000) 
Log-likelihood 44.1401 - - - - 
R2 0.9366 (b) 0.2210 (c) 0.3180 - - 
RMSE .0006 .0033 .0032 - - 
BIC -72.019 - - - - 
AIC -82.280 - - - - 
estimated - .00012 .1648 - - 
(Σu; Σe) - (.0001; .0032) - - - 
(θmin; θmax) - (.0109; .0214) - - - 
Scale 
Parameter 
- - - - 0.0000 
Friedman C S I 
test 
159.724 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
53.289 (0.0000) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 39.30% 37.82% 36.98% 36.84% 38.12% 
Mean 
CATEGG (d) 
47.00% 
Median 
CATEGG (d) 
48.79% 
N.B.: White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) F Stat.; (b) R2between; (c) R2overall; (d) 
in 2009. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
Regarding the Scandinavian countries, the empirical evidence found is 
contrary to the presence of the “BARS curve”. In fact, even though the ex-
planatory variables carry the expected sign, their statistical relevance is only 
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attested around 20%. In any case, using the estimate coefficients, a share of 
optimal expenditure equal to 37.9% is obtained, neatly below the group av-
erage in 2009. For those countries as well, the two variables are affected by 
a cross-sectional type dependence (Table 13). 
 
Table 13 – “BARS curve” for Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, 
1970-2009). 
Dependent Variable: (d(TGDPGK) Fixed Effects with AR(1) 
Disturbances 
Constant 1.1206** 
(.4745) 
CATEGG .3883 
(.3072) 
CATEGG2 -.5121 
(.3953) 
Number of observations 85 
Number of groups 3 
F 1.93 
(0.1526) 
RMSE .0038 
R2within .0459 
 .0585 
(Σu; Σe) (.0010; .0039) 
Baltagi-Wu LBI test 1.2638 
Bhargava et al. DW M test 1.1739 
Friedman C S I test 84.837 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
32.900 (0.0000) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 37.91% 
Mean CATEGG (a) 55.02% 
Median CATEGG (a) 55.41% 
N.B.: White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) in 2009. Significance levels: * 10%, 
** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
Finally, regarding the Mediterranean countries’ group (Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain) the empirical evidence is favourable, and while the op-
timal expenditure curve is attested on 43%, the average in 2009 was above 
47%, evoking the need for a reduction of the expenditure share on aggre-
gate income of 4.5%. The two variables show once again the presence of 
cross-dependence (Table 14). 
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Table 14 – “BARS curve” regarding Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain, 1970-2009). 
Dependent Variable: (d(TGDPGK) GEE 
Population-Averaged 
Constant -2.0190*** 
(.4377) 
CATEGG .9911*** 
(.1958) 
CATEGG2 -1.1444*** 
(.2333) 
Number of observations 81 
Number of groups 4 
Wald χ2 49.10 
(0.0000) 
Scale Parameter .0000 
Friedman C S I test 65.130 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
13.088 (0.0045) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 43.30% 
Mean CATEGG (a) 47.79% 
Median CATEGG (a) 47.59% 
N.B.: White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) in 2009. Significance levels: * 10%, 
** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
Analyzing country aggregation according to the per capita income, for 
the group of “richer” countries (fourth quartile of our distribution) we ob-
tain a strong empirical evidence supporting the curve, the peak of which is 
between 35% and 38%, some 13 to 16 p.p. below the average in 2009. For 
both variables problems related to the cross-sectional dependence remain 
(Table 15). 
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Table 15 – “BARS curve” regarding the countries of the fourth quartile (Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 1970-2009). 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(d(TGDPGK) 
Between 
WLS with 
Jackknife 
Random Ef-
fects with 
AR(1) 
Disturbances 
Prais-
Winsten 
(PCSEs) 
Panel 
C-S T-S 
FGLS 
GEE 
Population-
Averaged 
Constant 1.1914** 
(.3791) 
.4647** 
(.1967) 
.5083** 
(.2467) 
.5025** 
(.2556) 
.4119*** 
(.1119) 
CATEGG .4187** 
(.1517) 
.1399* 
(.0773) 
.1545* 
(.0940) 
.1527 
(.0967) 
.1177*** 
(.0439) 
CATEGG2 -.5490** 
(.1890) 
-.1957** 
(.0969) 
-.2153* 
(.1194) 
-.2127* 
(.1231) 
-.1685** 
(.0551) 
AR Correction - - 1 1 1 
Number of obs. 204 204 204 204 204 
Number of 
groups 
7 7 7 7 7 
Wald χ2 124.24 (a) 
(0.0000) 
56.14 
(0.0000) 
43.76 
(0.0000) 
34.10 
(0.0000) 
131.44 
(0.0000) 
Log-likelihood 44.6202 - - - - 
R2 0.9707 (b) 0.2660 (c) 0.2589 - - 
RMSE .0005 .0042 .0038 - - 
BIC 73.28607 - - - - 
AIC 83.24043 - - - - 
estimated - 0 -.0122 - - 
(Σu; Σe) - (0; .0042) - - - 
(θmin; θmax) - (0; 0) - - - 
Scale 
Parameter 
- - - - 0.0000 
Friedman C S I 
test 
138.929 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
50.300 (0.0000) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 38.13% 35.74% 36.89% 35.88% 34.91% 
Mean 
CATEGG (d) 
50.91% 
Median 
CATEGG (d) 
52.24% 
N.B.: White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) F Stat.; (b) R2between; (c) R2overall; (d) 
in 2009. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
Regarding the countries of the third quartile, too, the empirical evidence 
is favourable to the curve, showing the necessity of an expenditure reduc-
tion of approximately 15 p.p. Once again, the variables are affected by 
cross-dependence (Table 16). 
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Table 16 – “BARS curve” regarding the countries of the third quartile (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and United Kingdom, 1970-2009). 
Dependent Variable: (d(TGDPGK) Prais-Winsten (PCSEs) Panel 
Constant .4396** 
(.1913) 
CATEGG .1357* 
(.0734) 
CATEGG2 -.1879** 
(.0930) 
Number of observations 189 
Number of groups 7 
Wald χ2 55.48 
(0.0000) 
RMSE .0028 
R2 0.2325 
 -.0347 
Friedman C S I test 71.211 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
37.658 (0.0000) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 36.12% 
Mean CATEGG (a) 50.51% 
Median CATEGG (a) 51.17% 
N.B.: White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) in 2009. Significance levels: * 10%, 
** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
The second quartile countries, for which once again there exist a “BARS 
curve”, show a need for public expenditure reduction lower than the third 
and fourth quartile ones. In fact, here the peak is attested between 38% and 
39%, between 6 and 7 p.p. below the average of 2009. As in the former 
cases we find the presence of cross-sectional dependence (Table 17). 
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Table 17 – “BARS curve” regarding the second quartile countries (Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, and Slovakia, 1970-2009). 
Dependent Variable: 
(d(TGDPGK) 
Fixed Effects with 
AR(1) 
Disturbances 
Prais-Winsten 
(PCSEs) Panel 
C-S T-S 
FGLS 
Constant 1.3459** 
(.5745) 
1.0781** 
(.4660) 
1.1224* 
(.6161) 
CATEGG .4987 
(.3347) 
.3776* 
(.1980) 
.3948 
(.2657) 
CATEGG2 -.6398 
(.4066) 
-.4959** 
(.2407) 
-.5175 
(.3213) 
AR Correction 1 1 1 
Number of obs. 116 116 116 
Number of groups 7 7 7 
Wald χ2 9.40 (a) 
(0.0002) 
28.56 
(0.0000) 
30.70 
(0.0000) 
Log-likelihood 454.2153 - - 
R2 0.1495 0.2379 - 
BIC 894.170 - - 
AIC 902.431 - - 
estimated .2684 .4470 - 
Scale Parameter - - - 
Baltagi-Wu LBI test 1.5135 - - 
Bhargava et al. DW 
M test 
1.1617 - - 
Friedman C S I test 25.406 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
22.436 (0.0000) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 38.98% 38.08% 38.14% 
Mean 
CATEGG (b) 
45.37% 
Median 
CATEGG (b) 
44.72% 
N.B.: White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) F Stat.; (b) in 2009. Significance 
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
For “poorer” countries (belonging to the first quartile) in EU-27, a curve 
is marked out showing the need for a more limited expenditure, neatly 
lower than the reductions indicated for the other three quartiles. In this 
group, in fact, G* is attested between 39 and 40.5%, just 4 or 5 p.p. lower 
than the average in 2009. The analysis of cross-sectional dependence shows 
that it exists for the aggregate income, while it can be excluded for public 
expenditure with a relevance level equal to 5% (but not 10%). Moreover, 
the variables seem to be cointegrated (Table 18). 
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Table 18 – “BARS curve” for the first quartile countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, 1970-2009). 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(d(TGDPGK) 
Random Effects Prais-Winsten 
(PCSEs) Panel 
C-S T-S 
FGLS 
Fixed Effects 
Driscoll-
Kraay SE 
Constant 1.3304** 
(.6317) 
.7716 
(.4772) 
.9248* 
(.4812) 
1.541* 
(.6459) 
CATEGG .5365** 
(.2621) 
.2887 
(.1946) 
.3558* 
(.1972) 
.6305* 
(.2584) 
CATEGG2 -.6648** 
(.3217) 
-.3679 
(.2406) 
-.4486* 
(.2433) 
-.7770* 
(.3218) 
AR Correction - 1 1 - 
Number of obs. 81 81 81 81 
Number of 
groups 
6 6 6 6 
Wald χ2 4.73 
(0.0940) 
5.83 
(0.0541) 
6.42 
(0.0404) 
3.19 (a) 
(0.1282) 
RMSE .0051 - .0045 - 
R2 .0690 - 0.2804 0.0653 (b) 
estimated .1953 - .5959 - 
(Σu; Σe) (.0025; .0052) - - - 
(θmin; θmax) (0.4780; 0.5231) - - - 
Friedman C S I 
test 
38.830 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
10.109 (0.0722) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 40.35% 39.23% 39.65% 40.57% 
Mean 
CATEGG (c) 
44.30% 
Median 
CATEGG (c) 
44.99% 
N.B. White’s correction for  heteroscedasticity; (a) F Stat.; (b) R2within; (c) in 2009. Sig-
nificance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
The last aggregation to be examined regards the countries that have the 
Euro as their national currency. The empirical evidence is favourable to the 
“BARS curve”, and shows how a reduction of the expenditure share on the 
GDP of approximately 13% is desirable. In this case, too, effects of cross-
dependence (for each variable, Table 19). 
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Table 19 – “BARS curve” for the Euro-area (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, and Spain, 1970-2009). 
Dependent Variable: 
(d(TGDPGK) 
C-S T-S FGLS Prais-Winsten (PCSEs) 
Panel 
Constant .4652** 
(.1878) 
.4732*** 
(.1558) 
CATEGG .1319* 
(.0732) 
.1375** 
(.0608) 
CATEGG2 -.1898** 
(.0921) 
-.1956*** 
(.0764) 
Number of observations 377 377 
Number of groups 15 15 
Wald χ2 115.03 
(0.0000) 
92.55 
(0.0000) 
RMSE - .0034 
R2 - 0.3552 
 - .0874 
Friedman C S I test 107.861 (0.0000) per TGDPGK 
61.116 (0.0000) per CATEGG 
Curve peak 34.74% 35.14% 
Mean CATEGG (a) 48.19% 
Median CATEGG (a) 49.01% 
N.B.: White’s correction for heteroscedasticity; (a) in 2009. Significance levels:* 10%, 
** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
 
Finally, in Table 20, in order to recap and facilitate the comparisons, we 
sum up the panel estimates. 
 
Table 20 – BARS curve peak, summary of estimates (1970-2009). 
Panel Median G/Y (a) Mean G/Y (a) Curve peak 
EU-27 47.64% 47.90% 37.29% 
Euroarea 49.01% 48.19% 35.14% 
Anglo-Saxon 46.74% 47.88% 41.96% 
Eastern European 44.43% 44.11% 39.74% 
Western Continental 
European 
48.79% 47.00% 36.84% 
Mediterranean 47.59% 47.79% 43.30% 
I Quartile 44.99% 44.30%  39.65% 
II Quartile 44.72% 45.37% 38.14% 
III Quartile 51.17% 50.51% 36.12% 
IV Quartile 52.24% 50.91% 35.88% 
N.B.: (a) in 2009. 
Source: our calculations on AMECO and TED data. 
 
As is shown above, only for Scandinavian countries does not emerge a 
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BARS curve. For the others sub-groups, the optimal size of Government – 
measured by curve peak – lies in the interval 36-43%. It is quite interesting 
to note that for the Western Continental European countries – that have a 
common tradition of welfare state and complex labour institutions – the 
peak of the BARS curve is at a much lower level than for the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, which, at least from Thatcher’s reforms (MAGAZZINO (2010c)), 
have a much more flexible labour market. 
It is also interesting to note that the level of the peak of the BARS curve, 
on balance, increases with the increase of the per capita GDP, confirming 
the theoretical thesis that for countries who are in the former stages of eco-
nomic development, the ratio of public expenditure to GDP needs to be 
higher than for the countries with high per capita GDP, because of the 
presence of indivisibilities in the supply of public goods. 
 
5. – Concluding remarks and policy implications 
In the second half of the 20th century there has been a general growth in 
the size and aims of Government, due to the institution of modern Welfare 
State systems and to the intervention of the public economy in the eco-
nomic process. The rates of economic growth in the EU countries have un-
dergone a systematic reduction trough time. Several factors, including the 
aging of the population, the preference for leisure and low risk, the excesses 
of regulations of real economy together with lack of regulation in the mone-
tary and financial sector may have been among the causes of the reduction 
of growth rates. However, there are reason to believe that an “excessive” 
increase of the ratio of public expenditure to GDP reduces the rate of its 
growth, because the costs for the market economy of its financing may ex-
ceed its marginal productivity, and because the productivity of the market 
economy which is exposed to the competitive pressure tends to grow more 
than that of the public sector, which is not exposed to these pressures. 
As for the 27 EU member countries we considered, a country having a 
public expenditure/GDP ratio above 10% the peak, on average, suffers a 
diminution in the GDP growth rate of 2.1%. Moreover, an increase of 1 
percentage point in the variation of public expenditure approximately corre-
sponds to a 0.04% reduction in the acceleration rate of economic activity. 
Moreover, we found statistically significant inverse relationships between 
the growth of the ratios of public expenditure to GDP and the GDP 
Optimal Size of Government and Economic Growth in EU-27 
FORTE – MAGAZZINO 
 
- 39 - 
 
growth rate, and their variations. Thus we were able to construct statistically 
significant BARS curves, for the 12 countries for whom we have homoge-
neous data for the entire period and, by panel data methodology, for the 27 
EU countries as a whole, and for nine sub-groups of “homogenous” coun-
tries. In all these cases, the considered EU countries are on the right side of 
the “BARS curve”. For the EU-27 panel the peak of the BARS curve is at-
tained for an expenditure of 37.29% of GDP, while the average ratio is 
47.9%: i.e. 10 points more. For the 12 EU countries for whom an individual 
time-series analysis was meaningful (because of the availability of data), we 
found that the peak of the BARS curve ranges from 35.39 for Belgium and 
35.52 for The Netherlands to 44.47 for Ireland and 43.50 for UK. The 
minimum deviation from the level of the public expenditure that coincides 
with the peak of the BARS curve is that of Ireland with only 2.27 points, 
followed by Luxemburg with 2.31%. UK is in the third place with 7.67 
points in excess. The maximum deviation is that of Belgium of about 18%, 
followed by Denmark with a percentage of about 16.78%. 
Considering the four groups of EU countries homogeneous from the 
point of view of their welfare and labour market institutions, for whom we 
found a BARS curve, it emerged that for the Mediterranean countries 
whose welfare state is relatively young and the labour market not extensively 
regulated, the peak of the BARS curve is reached by a public expenditure at 
the share of 43.30% of GDP: not much different from that found for Por-
tugal. Also for the Anglo-Saxon countries the peak of the BARS curve co-
incides with a share of public expenditures higher than 40% of GDP 
(41.96%). In this case too the labour market (after the Thatcher’s reforms) 
is flexible, but the welfare state is relatively big. Likely an important factor 
that allows to a size of the public expenditure greater than 40% of GDP, to 
be consistent with GDP growth maximization it is its efficiency. For East-
ern European countries, whose welfare state features and labour market in-
stitutions are small, the share of public expenditure consistent with the peak 
of the BARS curve is close to 40%. On the other hand, for the Western 
Continental EU countries, that have an old tradition of welfare state and of 
labour market regulations, but also a mature economy, the share of public 
expenditure coinciding with the peak of the BARS curve is equal to 36.84%. 
For these countries the excess of the level of public expenditure on that co-
inciding with GDP maximization it is of about 10 points. For the Mediter-
ranean countries and the Eastern European countries it is of about 4 and an 
half points, and for the Anglo-Saxon countries of about 6 points. The peak 
of the BARS curve it is inversely correlated with the per capita GDP of the 
EU countries. For the quartile with the highest per capita GDP the level of 
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public expenditure corresponding to the peak of the BARS curve is around 
36%, as for the III quartile. It goes up to about 38% for the II quartile, and 
rising to 40% for the I quartile. The excess of the size of public expenditure 
on the share of GDP maximization is of about 4.5 points for the countries 
with the lower per capita GDP. It rises to about 7 points for the countries 
of the next quartile, and it spatters to about 15 points for those in the third 
and fourth quartile. On balance, one may argue that the need of reducing 
the share of public expenditure to GDP to reach the level consistent with 
GDP growth maximization increase with their per capita GDP. 
We do not argue that one should reduce the Government sizes by per-
centage that allows to have a maximum GDP growth rate. Obviously, dis-
tributive factors do matter. However, the cost of equity in terms of GDP 
growth has to be considered, together with the question of present versus 
future welfare. On the other hand, macroeconomics may be elusive: one 
cannot argue that any percentage reduction in the share of public expendi-
ture on GDP would have the same effect as for the increase of GDP. The 
efficiency of public expenditure varies from country to country. The com-
position of the public expenditure and of its financing should be consid-
ered. Indeed, as we have seen, the different groups of countries have their 
peak at a different point. And this outcome suggest that one should con-
sider not only the size but also the quality of the two sides of the public fi-
nances of the various countries. Further research may prove useful to show 
light on the disparities emerging in the empirical analysis of individual coun-
tries and of the sub groups of the panel. However, the present research 
provides enough evidence that high GDP countries of EU have overcome 
the level of government size compatible with GDP growth rate maximiza-
tion. 
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Table A – Stationarity tests for some EU members (1970-2009). 
Country  Stationarity tests 
Variable Deterministic component ADF ERS PP KPSS 
Austria TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant 
-2.778 (NS) 
-2.483 (NS) 
-1.652 (NS) 
-1.471 (NS) 
-1.961 (NS) 
-2.490 (NS) 
0.273 (NS) 
0.340 (NS) 
Belgium TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant 
-2.746 (NS) 
-2.316 (NS) 
-1.090 (NS) 
-0.925 (NS) 
-2.712 (NS) 
-2.711 (NS) 
0.343 (NS) 
0.268 (NS) 
Denmark TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant 
-3.177 (NS) 
-2.140 (NS) 
-1.050 (NS) 
-0.606 (NS) 
-3.181 (NS) 
-2.112 (NS) 
0.393 (NS) 
0.971 (NS) 
Finland TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant 
-2.492 (NS) 
-1.447 (NS) 
-1.554 (NS) 
-0.904 (NS) 
-2.301 (NS) 
-1.704 (NS) 
0.275 (NS) 
0.632 (NS) 
France TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant, trend 
-3.123 (NS) 
-2.823 (NS) 
-0.719 (NS) 
-0.155 (NS) 
-3.452 (TS) 
-2.509 (NS) 
0.519 (NS) 
1.06 (NS) 
Greece TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant, trend 
-2.622 (NS) 
-2.604 (NS) 
-1.580 (NS) 
-0.779 (NS) 
-2.877 (NS) 
-2.554 (NS) 
0.261 (NS) 
0.506 (NS) 
Ireland TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant 
-1.757 (NS) 
-1.803 (NS) 
-1.654 (NS) 
-1.236 (NS) 
-1.135 (NS) 
-1.626 (NS)S 
0.458 (NS) 
0.825 (NS) 
Italy TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant, trend 
-2.690 (TS) 
-3.508 (LS) 
-0.070 (NS) 
-0.564 (NS) 
-2.623 (TS) 
-3.346 (TS) 
0.576 (NS) 
0.270 (NS) 
Netherlands TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant 
-3.547 (TS) 
-1.774 (NS) 
-1.613 (NS) 
-1.051 (NS) 
-2.115 (TS) 
-1.806 (NS) 
0.352 (NS) 
0.532 (NS) 
Portugal TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant 
constant, trend 
-1.686 (NS) 
-1.945 (NS) 
-0.857 (NS) 
0.997 (NS) 
-1.387 (NS) 
-1.866 (NS) 
0.496 (NS) 
1.11 (NS) 
UK TGDPGK 
CATEGG 
constant, trend 
constant 
-3.083 (NS) 
-0.981 (NS) 
-3.058 (NS) 
-1.261 (NS) 
-2.313 (NS) 
-0.730 (NS) 
0.227 (NS) 
0.249 (NS) 
Source: our elaborations on AMECO and TED data. Notes: LS: Level Stationary; NS: Non Stationary; TS: Trend Stationary. 
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Table B – Correlation matrix for some EU members (1970-2009). 
Country Correlation between TGDPGK and CATEGG 
Austria 0.0725 
Belgium 0.1738 
Denmark 0.5766 
Finland 0.4687 
France 0.7048 
Germany 0.4180 
Greece 0.3844 
Ireland -0.8408 
Italy 0.1196 
Netherlands -0.2078 
Portugal 0.9164 
UK 0.0505 
Source: our elaborations on AMECO and TED data. 
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